An updated re-entry analysis of the Hubble Space Telescope by Baker, Kyle et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2019-12
An updated re-entry analysis of the Hubble
Space Telescope
Baker, Kyle; Culton, Eryn; Lang, Jonathan; Lewis, Zachary;
Perez-Aleman, Robert; Rizzo, Alexa; Smeresky, Brendon;
Starks, Anthony; Teneyck, Joshua; Rhatigan, Jennifer...
Baker, Kyle, et al. "An updated re-entry analysis of the Hubble Space Telescope."
Journal of Space Safety Engineering (2020).
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/65657
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: JSSE [m5GeSdc; July 16, 2020;3:20 ] 
Journal of Space Safety Engineering xxx (xxxx) xxx 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Journal of Space Safety Engineering 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jsse 
An updated re-entry analysis of the Hubble Space Telescope 
Kyle Baker a , Eryn Culton a , Jonathan Lang a , Zachary Lewis a , Robert Perez-Alemany a , 
Alexa Rizzo a , Brendon Smeresky a , Anthony Starks a , Joshua Teneyck a , Jennifer Rhatigan b , ∗ , 
Marcello Romano b 
a Space Systems Engineering Students, Naval Postgraduate School, 1 University Circle, Monterey CA 93940, USA 
b Faculty, Naval Postgraduate School, 1 University Circle, Monterey, CA 93940, USA 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
Keywords: 
Hubble Space Telescope 
Spacecraft disposal 
Spacecraft reentry 
Rendevous and proximity operations 
Orbital debris 
Article history: 
Received 27 May 2020 
Accepted 5 July 2020 
Available online xxx 
a b s t r a c t 
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST), launched in 1990, has without question given us a better understanding of 
the Universe [1] . The storied spacecraft has far exceeded its design life and, in spite of four repair missions, 
is nearing the end of its useful lifespan. Originally designed to be returned by the Space Shuttle, the HST has 
no on-board propulsion system. A 2012 study estimated that without intervention, the HST will re-enter the 
atmosphere in approximately 2027 with a 1:240 risk of fatality [2] . This study updates that analysis with more 
recent de-orbit technologies and updated trajectory information. We propose a design solution to safely perform 
a targeted de-orbit, assuming a worst-case scenario (a non-functional, tumbling spacecraft). Multiple de-orbit 
options are assessed to actively capture the satellite. Results frame an approach that could be accomplished with 
proven technologies at reasonable cost to improve the fatality risk as required by US Government regulation [3] . 
Moreover, delayed action would significantly increase mission cost and complexity so we recommend a project 
















































. Introduction and background 
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST), one of the most iconic satellites
n history, is still in use but has lost altitude due to atmospheric drag
nd deteriorated mechanically due to system degradation over its nearly
hirty years on-orbit. The original deorbit plan for HST was to use the
pace shuttle to retrieve it at end of its life; however, no one foresaw
hat it would outlive the Space Shuttle Program [1] . A previous study
2] investigated three de-orbit proposals: uncontrolled re-entry, which
as deemed unacceptable due to the risk; a storage orbit beyond HST’s
urrent orbit, which delayed but did not solve the problem; and lastly, a
ontrolled de-orbit using an additional ‘capture’ spacecraft, which was
xamined and deemed to be the most feasible solution. NASA recom-
ended a project start date of 2019; however, low solar activity in the
ntervening years has effectively extended a projected start date. 
.1. HST current status and configuration 
HST is 13.2 m long, has a max diameter of 4.2 m, and had a final
ass of 12,218 kg after all servicing missions, resulting in an estimated
tumbling) ballistic coefficient of 82 kg/m 2 [4,6] . As of mid-2019, the
ST orbit perigee is 534.4 km, and the attitude control system consists
f one fully mission-capable gyroscope, one partially mission-capable
yroscope, and one non-mission capable gyroscope [4] . In anticipation
f a capture mission, the Low Impact Docking System (LIDS) soft-capture∗ Corresponding author. 
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Safety Engineering, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2020.07.006 echanism was attached to HST during the last servicing mission. The
ST also has multiple trunnion pins and hand rails as depicted in Fig. 1 .
.2. Study objectives 
This study was conducted by students at the Naval Postgraduate
chool as a capstone design project, with the objective of improving the
asualty risk by designing a method to safely de-orbit HST before its nat-
ral, uncontrolled re-entry. Seven years have passed since NASA’s 2012
eorbit study. Since then HST’s orbit has decayed while launch, ren-
ezvous, and de-orbit technologies have advanced. This report updates
hat study with new orbital parameters, technologies, and a proposed
pacecraft design that would de-orbit HST. The spacecraft proposed is
Capture Hubble and Safe Re -entry ” (CHASER). 
CHASER has two configurations. The first, and recommended con-
guration, is a spacecraft that captures and deorbits HST using the LIDS
ocking mechanism (hereafter called the ‘LIDS-only mission’). This is
he most straight-forward solution found. However, LIDS has a maxi-
um rotation rate that could be exceeded as HST’s orbit decays (more
n this later), so a ‘worst-case’ mission using a robotic arm to capture
ST prior to LIDS docking, that can accommodate higher tumble rates,
as also assessed. We call this the ‘robotic arm + LIDS mission’. While
ot recommended due to cost and complexity, it is important to char-
cterize this alternative potential mission as a consequence of delay.
omparison of the two possibilities bounds the tradeoffs necessary to
ecide when to mount a deorbit mission for HST. ). 
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Fig. 1. (Left) HST, highlighting placement of two Flight Re- 
leasable Grapple Fixtures (FRGF). (Right) Placement of pay- 






























































































a  . Project overview 
.1. Ground rules and assumptions 
The goal was to make technically sound assumptions and estab-
ish applicable ground rules and constraints. Two primary assumptions
rove the design. First, in the 2012 study, NASA determined that HST’s
aximum allowable rotation rate was 0.22 °/ sec per axis. This is ex-
ected to occur as the spacecraft approaches a 500-km perigee (due
o expected atmospheric effects at that altitude). Capture beyond this
otation rate was deemed unmanageable; therefore, we use this as the
imiting rate in our analyses. This narrowed the trade space, put an up-
er limit on de-tumble torque calculations, and focused mission timeline
nd scope. Second, we based the CHASER concept upon heritage from
he NASA Restore-L on-orbit satellite servicing mission planned for 2020
r later; including the SSL-1300 bus architecture and RAVEN sensor suite
11] . Reliance upon heritage enabled us to baseline proven technologies
hat could potentially lower cost and schedule risk as well as accomplish
he design within the classroom constraints. We further assumed Track-
ng and Data Relay Satellites (TDRS) systems would be preferred for
pace-based communications [7] . Lastly, the Falcon 9 [16] was assumed
o be the launch vehicle, and CHASER was assumed to be the primary
ayload so that Classical Orbital Elements (COEs) could be selected to
inimize required rendezvous operations. 
.2. High level requirements 
Requirements were identified to capture the major decision drivers
f CHASER’s design. They were broken up into four mission phases:
rappling, de-tumbling, berthing, and deorbiting. Functionally, they
ere attributed to CHASER’s control system, robotic arm, and propul-
ion system. Of note, the key requirements that levied performance
hresholds were for the robotic arm accuracy, end-effector type, control
ystem de-tumble rates, and re-entry splashdown location. An important
ounding requirement regards the LIDS maximum capture limit. LIDS is
apable of maximum 0.15 °/ sec roll rate and 0.15 °/ sec combined pitch
nd yaw rate [9] . These roll rates are reasonable if HST is still under
ctive control when captured, and even shortly after loss of control at
ufficient altitudes. As the HST orbit decays, however, these rates could
e exceeded, and it is difficult to predict when and at what altitude
his could occur. This requirement drove the consideration of the two
ission types described in Section 1.2 . 
.3. Trade space 
A trade space analysis was conducted using two trade trees: first, for
ethods to capture and deorbit HST; second, for methods to grapple
ST. The former addressed the uncertainty in HST’s operational status
ue to system degradation and failures, but required an assumption that
ST could be tumbling outside of the LIDS capture limit. This could re-
ult in deorbit forces exceeding the capability of de-orbiting with only
 robotic arm, yielding a decision to develop a spacecraft with both a
obotic arm and docking system (the ‘robotic arm + LIDS mission’). The
atter trade tree addressed the location of CHASER’s connection to HST
o efficiently reduce the roll, pitch, and yaw rates to 0 °/ sec . Multiple2 edicated and undedicated grapple points and end-effectors were ana-
yzed ( Fig. 1 ), along with whether CHASER would release its connec-
ion to HST upon completion of de-tumbling or maintain connection for
erthing. Down-selection was based on the ability to support expected
e-tumble forces, the complexity of grapple operations, and the risk of
mparting forces to HST upon arm detachment. Based on these factors
nd advisement from subject matter experts, maintaining a robotic-arm
onnection while berthing with LIDS was chosen as the baseline opera-
ional scenario. 
.4. Robotic arms 
Multiple existing and planned robotic arms were evaluated to meet
equirements. We examined the Canadarm, Canadarm2 (SSRMS), and
anadarm3; the Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator; Space Station
emote Manipulator System (SSRMS); the Japanese Experiment Module
emote Manipulator System (JEMRMS); and the European Robotic Arm
ERA). Except Canadarm3, and ERA, all these robotic arms have been
perated onboard or in proximity to, the International Space Station
ISS). Two arms not involved with ISS operations were also considered:
he Restore-L arm and Orbital Express [22] . Of these, Canadarm2 is
he only candidate capable of handling the large HST mass [8] . While
versized, with a capacity exceeding 100,000 kg, we used Canadarm2
s the baseline for meeting all known requirements. 
. Concept of operation (CONOPS) 
Fig. 2 depicts the CONOPS for ‘robotic arm + LIDS mission’ CHASER
e-orbit mission. The mission was broken up into nine phases, from
aunch until splashdown in a remote area. 
. Design 
The following section details the overall design of the ‘robotic
rm + LIDS mission’ CHASER, focusing on the satellite bus, systems en-
ineering practices, and highest priority subsystems. We note that the
ubsystems addressed are not all-inclusive, but focused on those most
ritical to the mission to assess the adequacy of the selected bus. For
nstance, we did not assess the thermal subsystem because we did not
dentify any design drivers beyond the SSL-1300 bus capabilities. 
.1. Spacecraft bus 
CHASER utilizes the SSL-1300 bus as noted in Section 2.1 . Over 100
SL-1300 buses have been launched to GEO orbit, increasing its matu-
ity, compatibility, and mission heritage. While nominally a communi-
ations satellite bus, it was selected for the Restore-L mission, and we
pted to utilize this heritage. Table 1 lists the specific capabilities re-
uired by CHASER as compared to the heritage systems adopted in our
esign, showing that all requirements can be met. 
.2. Robotic arm 
We evaluated recent robotic arms used for spacecraft rendevous
nd proximity operations (e.g. [22] ). The Canadarm2 is the baseline
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or CHASER’s Robotic Arm (CHARM) because no other current space
ated robotic arm can match Canadarm2’s capabilities. This capability
s needed because with a mass of 12,128 kg and length of 13.1 m, HST
as a high moment of inertia. Canadarm2 uses Joint Motor Modules
JMM) that feature harmonic drives in its seven Degrees of Freedom
DOF) design. Although its specifications are restricted, early NASA de-
ign documents show these components enable a high torsional stiffness
ustaining a minimum torque of 1630 N-m while stationary, a torque
bility of 1022 N-m while moving, and positional capacity to move pay-
oads up to 116,000 kg [14] . We assume capability available from a
armonic drive of equivalent size [15] . Because this exceeds some of
HARM’s requirements, the design was scaled down ( Fig. 3 ). For ex-
mple, the joint, latching end-effector (LEE), and camera on one end
f CHARM were not needed and removed. Conversely, CHARM uses the
ame construction material, JMMs, and LEE as Canadarm2, but the links
ere shortened to both fit within the Falcon 9 launch vehicle fairing and
eet mission requirements for grapple and docking with LIDS. 
Capturing and de-tumbling HST is the primary mission challenge.
he ‘worst-case’ 0.22 °/ sec tumble rate was used in our analysis to de-Table 1 
CHASER design requirements compared to that available fro
Category Capability Heritage sys
Power Power SSL-1300 
Battery Capacity SSL-1300 
Robotic Arm Translational Arm Speed CANADARM
Rotational Arm Speed CANADARM
DOF CANADARM
Joint Torsional Moment CANADARM
Communications Uplink/Downlink SSL-1300 
Data Storage SSL-1300 
Propulsion Delta V SSL-1300 
Propellant SSL-1300 
Spacecraft Torque SSL-1300 
ADCS 4-wheel, 3 axis control SSL-1300 
Gyro control SSL-1300 
Sensor Package Visual Range RAVEN 
Visual Resolution RAVEN 
IR Range RAVEN 
IR Resolution RAVEN 
LIDAR Range RAVEN 
LIDAR Resolution RAVEN 
3 ermine the expected torques applied to the joints and the requisite
ounteracting torque for the CHASER propulsion system while main-
aining the arm in a straight and stiff condition. The Spacecraft Robotics
oolkit was used in MATLAB for the analysis [17] . It uses kinematic
nd dynamic properties to analyze positions, velocities, forces, and
orques for each joint in the robotic arm and the CHASER. Prelimi-
ary results showed that the joints sustained the torques required to
e-tumble HST with large margins. The highest torque felt in the joints
as 222 N-m for a 7-minute HST de-tumble operation, well below
he joint torque limit of 1630 N-m. Further analysis will be required
o understand how to configure the attitude control with respect to
ST as well as to determine the best positioning options to de-tumble
ST. 
A structural analysis for CHARM was completed using Solidworks R ○
howing a margin of safety of 3.4 for the arm. Preliminary analysis
hows CHARM is a very robust system that can handle much more than
ts mission requirements, indicating it can be further down-sized to save
ost and complexity if desired. m selected heritage systems. 
tem Required Level provided 
~5kW 5–9kW 
3970 W-hr 4060 W-hrs 
2 0.016 m/s 0.36 m/s 
2 0.22 deg/s 4 deg/s 
2 6 7 
2 250 Nm 3000 Nm 
S, Ka Bands L, X, Ka, Ku, S, C Bands 
81 Mb 5.8 Tb 
180 m/s 4073 m/s 
916.5 kg 2272 kg 
67.5 Nm 68.2 Nm 
3 axis control 3 axis control 
1 laser ring gyro 2 laser ring gyros 
100 m ~16 km 
1000 × 1000 pixels 1000 × 1000 pixels 
100 m ~16 km 
640 × 480 pixels 640 × 480 pixels 
100 m ~16 km 
256 × 256 pixels 256 × 256 pixels 
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The propulsion system onboard CHASER has four main tasks to con-
uct: Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO), grapple, de-tumble,
nd de-orbit. The SSL-1300 bus provides enough technical capability to
ccomplish each of these tasks. It comes equipped with a bi-propellant,
ydrazine, and nitrogen-tetroxide system with a propellant capacity of
272 kg that can be increased up to 3800 kg [18] . The thrusters native
o the 1300 bus include a 445 N liquid apogee thruster and multiple
hrusters with 1222 N capacity as part of the Attitude and Orbital Con-
rol System (AOCS) [19] . The heritage system is designed for the main
hruster to boost a spacecraft into geostationary orbit with an isolation
alve that activates to shift the fuel to a hydrazine-only monopropellant
or AOCS operations. 
The amount of propellant necessary for RPO, grapple, and de-orbit
s determined by the ΔV necessary to change CHASER’s orbit. During
PO, the assumption is that CHASER will be placed into the same orbit
s HST with a 50-km separation. For orbit phasing, it was estimated
V = 0.003 km / s to decrease the separation between HST and CHASER
rom 50 km to one km, and ΔV = 0.001 km / s for each grapple attempt.
onsistent with [2] , CHASER will have more than enough propellant
o allow for four grapple attempts. The propellant necessary for the de-
umbling portion of the propulsion system is based on the length of time
t will take to bring the tumbling of the HST from 0.22 °/ sec to zero
/ sec . The mass of propellant can be calculated with an assumed time of
50 s and a known flow rate of 7.71 g/ sec . Using two of the 22 N AOCS
hrusters, a total of 3.9 kg was calculated to generate enough torque to
e-tumble HST. To deorbit HST, it was estimated ΔV = 0.145 km / s to
ecrease altitude from 500 km to 100 km. From there, the final burn to
eorbit the CHASER-HST results in ΔV = 0.031 km / s and a final burn
ime of 17.4 min. 
Including margin, the propellant needed is approximately 1000 kg,
nd is well within the capacity of the SSL-1300 capacity ( Table 1 ).
n addition, the heritage thrusters available provide enough capabil-
ty to complete all aspects of CHASER’s mission within reasonable time
rames. Therefore, the heritage SSL-1300 bus propulsion system is ro-
ust enough to satisfy all of CHASER’s requirements. Further study
ould be needed to validate the sizing and positioning of the thrusters
n the spacecraft. 
.4. Communications and command and data handling (C&DH) 
The TDRS constellation in Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) would serve
s a link between CHASER and ground control stations. TDRS is capable
f transmitting S-Band and Ka-Band communications with a downlink
ata rate of 7 Mbps with S-band and up to 350 Mbps with Ka-band [7] .
ia this analysis, it was determined that the CHASER mission communi-
ations would not be power limited nor bandwidth limited, as expected
f a SSL-1300 communication bus. 
CHASER’s C&DH architecture would be in accordance with the Con-
ultative Committee of Space Data systems, which provides a commu-
ication standard in support of space communication systems. The data
us architecture for the CHASER will be in accordance with the MIL-
TD-1553D. CHASER will employ semi-autonomous control throughout
he de-orbit mission. NASA’s assessment in [20] of Autonomous Deci-
ion Making and Robot Software is Technology Readiness Levels of 24 nd 5, respectively. Therefore, semi-autonomous control would enable
itting range gates and having human-in-the-loop commanding during
HASER’s approach to HST to administer proceed authority to move
ast designated waypoints. CHASER would use TLE data to maneuver
ithin ranges of 5 km, 1 km, and then 500 m. When CHASER is within
00 m of HST, ranging/characterization data would come from Raven
nd include range waypoints requiring proceed authority of 100 m,
0 m, 25 m, 10 m, then 1 m by 1 m until CHASER has grappled with
ST [20,21] . 
.5. Power 
CHASER’s peak power requirements would occur during capture and
re influenced by the bus, sensor package, robotic arm, and docking de-
ice loads. An estimate for nominal operational of the SSL-1300 Bus and
AVEN Sensor Suite is derived from Restore-L ’s rendezvous phase of op-
ration [5] . The CHARM power requirements are assumed to be roughly
he same order of magnitude as the power required for CANADARM 2
peration [10] . Lastly, LIDS power loading is derived from its succes-
or, the NASA Docking System [9] . This results in an expected peak
ower requirement of 5.5 kW for CHASER. Loral’s SSL product line
s highly modular and could scale up to provide from 5 kW of power
near Restore-L levels) to a maximum of about 20 kW, easily supporting
HASER power needs on their smallest model [17] . When a 30% power
argin is considered, the required battery capacity is between 3000 and
000 Watt-hours with a solar array size of 38 to 48 m 2 . 
.6. Sensor package 
In order to rendezvous with HST, CHASER would use the self-
ontained Raven sensor package to find, fix, and track the satellite. This
ackage would provide imagery of the area in vicinity of CHASER, de-
ermine distances to objects within its field of view, and provide that
nformation to the semi-autonomous rendezvous software. Raven , de-
eloped by NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, is heritage equipment,
aving been flight-tested aboard the ISS, and is planned for the Restore-L
n-orbit servicing mission that includes similar mission tasks like grap-
ling [11] . The system is composed of three visual sensors: LIDAR, IR,
nd EO Visual. Lastly, the resolution of the three cameras on the sensor
re estimated at 1000 × 1000 pixels each, with a max combined data
ate of 1 Hz. During operation, the camera would capture imagery, de-
ermine the distance to the target, and then use spacecraft gimbals to
aintain track of the target [11] . Therefore, Raven satisfies CHASER’s
ission requirements. 
.7. Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) 
A high-level FMEA was conducted for CHASER using the Ishikawa
tyled fishbone diagram in Fig. 4 [31] . Each of the mission phases have
t least one failure mode that would prevent mission completion. The
sync, grab, de-tumble ” and “re-orient, LIDS dock, stabilize ” phases each
ave two failure modes due to their potential impact. The diagram high-
ights areas that require mitigation strategies such as redundancy, de-
ign margin, and procedural attention in the CONOPS. For this study,
ach of the causes of failure below were captured in a risk analysis with
itigation strategies determined and applied (not include due to page
onstraints). 
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u  .8. Mass estimates 
CHASER’s mass budget was determined using the known and as-
umed masses of the major components and is depicted in Table 2 . The
asses were known for the bus, LIDS, and RAVEN. The mass value for
he CHASER Hubble Arm (CHARM) is based on Canadarm2, but modi-
ed to account for the scaled down dimensions and only one end-effector
10] . The wet mass for CHASER accounted for rendezvous and proxim-
ty operations, grapple, de-tumble, and deorbit while [12,13] were used
o determine the propellant mass margins. The mass calculations pre-
ented are for a scenario in which a single burn is enough to accomplish
ach of the propulsion mission phases. In actual operation, additional
ropellant will be required for station keeping and course corrections,
owever, the planned tank size and 50% propellant reserves account for
he additional fuel to support these events. 
. Program metrics 
.1. Schedule 
The developmental schedule for CHASER was adapted from the De-
artment of Defense’s acquisitions pipeline as described in DoD instruc-
ion 5000.02T [23] , and updated using timelines from Restore-L ’s sched-
le, as described in the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) As-
essments of Major Projects for NASA [24] . The schedule is a four-year
evelopment timeline. The main takeaway from the schedule is that theTable 2 
Mass budget for CHASER mission including both dry and wet 
mass values. 
System Components Mass 
STRUCTURES: Bus 916 kg 
CHARM 1000 kg 
LIDS 340 kg 
Sensor Package 60 kg 
CHASER Dry Mass 2316 kg 
PROPELLANT: RPO (10%) 2 kg 
Grapple (10%) 3 kg 
De-tumble 4 kg 
Deorbit 578 kg 
Reserves (50%) 295 kg 
Trapped Propellant (3%) 27 kg 
Loading Uncertainty (0.5%) 4 kg 
Subtotal 914 kg 






5 evelopment is heavily dependent upon the integration of heritage com-
onents, which would be a primary focus for the development team. 
.2. Cost 
As noted earlier, CHASER has two configurations: the ‘LIDS-only mis-
ion’ and the ‘robotic arm + LIDS mission’. Both were costed to provide
larity on when the mission should begin. We performed both paramet-
ic cost estimates (based on available Restore-L cost history) and using
ASA’s Project Cost Estimating Capability (PCEC) [25] . The tool took in
arious programmatic and technical inputs including known costs, work
reakdown structure, estimated schedule, component masses, lines of
ode, thrust, materials, part heritage and quality, orbital parameters,
nd more [26–28] . When part quality and heritage are varied, the ex-
ected cost range in FY2020 dollars ranges from $668 M to 792 M.
ost notably, when the robotic arm and its associated costs are not in-
luded, reflecting the ‘LIDS-only mission, the project can save upwards
f $200 M. This reinforces the conclusion that a mission should be launched
arly in order to perform a direct dock with HST in support of its eventual
eorbit. 
.3. Reliability 
Overall reliability was calculated for CHASER in aggregate, based
pon the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and reliability of each
ubsystem. The primary CHASER subsystems for analysis were the
AOCS), Power, CDH, TTC, and structures and mechanism system
Mech/Payload). The breakdown in Table 3 was adapted from [29] ,
hich analysed 156 failures on 129 satellites from a pool of over 4000
atellites over the past few decades. Several assumptions were made inTable 3 
Reliability calculations for CHASER primary subsystems and launch vehicle. 
Subsystem Name Component Percentage MTBF (years) Reliability 
AOCS 100% 801 0.9988 
Power 100% 949 0.9989 
C&DH/TTC 100% 1709 0.9994 
Mech/Payload 100% 2136 0.9995 
Docking 5% 1068 0.9991 
Payload 55% 3885 0.9997 
Other 100% 1831 0.9995 
Falcon Launch [3] 100% 0.0974 
CHASER Reliability (no L.V.) 0.9961 
Overall Reliability 0.9702 
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his adapted analysis. First, the average lifetime of a satellite was 10
ears, accumulating to 350,640,000 total hours in the study, adapted
rom the lower bound found in [30] . Second, not every satellite in the
tudy attempted a docking maneuver; a conservative 100 attempts were
sed for the reliability calculations. Third, CHASER’s mission length was
rolonged to one year. Lastly, SpaceX’s reliability of the Falcon 9 launch
ehicle was based upon 75 of 77 successful launches up to August 2019
16] . 
The results show the mission reliability without the launch vehicle
s over 99% and the reliability with the launch vehicle included is 97%.
ote that the launch vehicle reliability alone is 97% – the driving factor
or CHASER’s overall reliability. This result is to be expected and more-
ver confirms other analyses that have shown that the 1:10,000 re-entry
isk threshold cannot be met when launch vehicle reliability is included.
. Recommendations and future work 
According to a new data by NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
GSFC), HST will reach an altitude of 500 km in approximately eight
ears, around 2027 (personal communication with Scott Hull). Given
he difficulties of developing, testing, and launching a new space sys-
em, eight years is a relatively small amount of time to find a way to
ither deorbit HST or prolong its lifespan. In addition, while this study
as provided two options —a LIDS-only mission and a LIDS + robotic arm
ission, there is still much work to be done. 
Fig. 5 is a pictorial summary of the HST deorbit cost and complex-
ty analysis. As HST gradually decreases in altitude, remaining attitude
ontrol functionality is expected to further degrade. The rate of this is
nknown; however, at some point, HST may be declared a ‘dead bird’.
aking action to mount the simpler LIDS-only mission is the best option,
aving somewhere near $200 M over the more complex LIDS + robotic
rm mission. The robotic arm poses design and developmental chal-
enges, being both technically and operationally complex compared to
 docking mission. 
There are other options to prolonging HST’s orbital lifetime. CHASER
ould be designed to remain attached to HST and extend its life.
his would present significant attitude control system challenges due
o HST’s very stringent pointing requirements. Alternatively, CHASER
ould loiter-in-place proximate to HST until the final reaction wheel fails
r the orbit decays below acceptable limits. This would extend the sci-6 nce mission as long as possible and provide a safe de-orbit. We showed
arlier that the fuel capacity of CHASER could accommodate this. 
Our recommendation is to start the planning for the simpler LIDS
ocking mission, and evaluate whether this could prolong the HST sci-
nce return. We recommend that a loiter-in-place option be assessed for
HASER so that science can be accomplished for as long as possible. 
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